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I. INTRODUCTION 
Like a stone cast into a pond, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank1 produced an impact, the consequences of 
which continue to ripple in ever-widening circles. To examine these 
consequences from both a United States and a European perspective, the Pacific 
McGeorge Global Center for Business & Development and the Max Planck 
Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural 
Law joined together to conduct a pair of conferences, the first in Sacramento on 
 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
1. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  
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March 1, 2013, and the second in Luxembourg on March 25, 2013. The articles 
that follow are from papers presented at these sessions. 
The consequences emanating from Morrison and explored in these articles 
fall into a couple of circles. The first involves the impact of Morrison on the 
territorial reach of U.S. statutes beyond the securities laws. Morrison held that 
the Securities Exchange Act does not prohibit fraud in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security unless the purchase or sale took place in the United 
States.2 In reaching this result, the opinion for the Supreme Court placed critical 
reliance on the presumption against extraterritoriality—the notion that, barring 
evidence of a contrary intent, courts should presume Congress does not intend 
U.S. statutes to govern events outside the United States.3 This presumption did 
not begin with Morrison, and the Supreme Court continues to invoke it after 
Morrison—most recently in limiting the reach of the Alien Tort Statute in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.4 Morrison, however, marks a significant milestone 
in the Supreme Court’s growing affinity for the presumption and so it is 
appropriate to use Morrison’s impact as a focal point to consider where we stand 
with respect the territorial reach of U.S. statutes other than just the Securities 
Exchange Act. 
The second consequence of Morrison involves the reaction of other nations. 
For those in Europe or elsewhere outside the United States, the impact of 
Morrison and the subsequent Congressional reaction to Morrison5 is simple: look 
to your own nations’ laws when it comes to private remedies for securities frauds 
unless you bought or sold the security in the United States. This, in turn, raises 
the question of whether other nations will fill the resulting void by establishing 
private remedies such as those existing in the United States for dealing with 
securities frauds, and particularly some sort of class or collective action. 
Three articles in this symposium—my article and the articles by Professor 
Kenneth Gallant of the University of Arkansas, Little Rock, and by Professor 
Katherine Florey of the University of California, Davis—explore the impact of 
 
2. See generally id.  
3. See generally id. 
4. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013). 
5. Congress responded to the Morrison decision by attempting to resurrect the conduct and effects test for 
government enforcement actions, while leaving Morrison in place for private actions pending further study. See 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § XXX (2010) (granting 
jurisdiction to U.S. courts over government prosecutions of securities frauds in which conduct constituting a 
significant step in the furtherance of the fraud occurs in the United States or conduct outside the United States 
has a foreseeable substantial effect in the United States), 929Y (directing the SEC to study how Congress 
should respond to Morrison for private actions). The reference to “jurisdiction” in Section 929B(2), rather than 
to whether the acts violate Section 10(b), seems to be a mistake resulting from the quick drafting necessary to 
respond to Morrison if the provision was to make it into the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & 
Kelly Flanagan, Transnational Dealings—Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46 INT’L. LAW. 829, 842 
(2012). 
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Morrison’s invocation of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Professor 
Gallant’s article, The Indeterminate International Law of Jurisdiction, the 
Presumption Against Extraterritorial Effect of Statutes, and Certainty in U.S. 
Criminal Law, approaches the matter in light of the policy that those who might 
face prosecution for violating a criminal law ought to know what law governs 
their conduct. From this perspective, he finds that the Supreme Court’s 
invocation of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison represents a 
small positive step insofar as it might force Congress to explicitly address the 
jurisdictional reach of its legislation; thereby aiding the cause of giving fair 
notice to those whose conduct U.S. laws might reach, as well as placing the 
jurisdictional decision in the hands of a branch of government that Professor 
Gallant argues has shown somewhat greater sensitivity to the obligations of 
international law than has been true of the judiciary. While applauding the 
Court’s general direction, Professor Gallant criticizes some of the Court’s 
specific reasoning insofar as Morrison, contrary to the traditional understanding 
of the reach of criminal statutes, applies the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to a situation in which some of the elements of the prohibited 
act occurred within the United States. Professor Florey’s article, Bridging the 
Divide: The Case for Harmonizing State and Federal Extraterritoriality 
Principles After Morrison and Kiobel, by contrast, suggests a scenario under 
which the Supreme Court’s invocation of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in Morrison ironically may produce greater uncertainty as far as 
whose law applies. Specifically, Professor Florey’s thesis is that Morrison may 
move litigants to pursue actions under state law in state courts for conduct to 
which the presumption against extraterritoriality renders Federal law 
inapplicable. This is not simply because Morrison shuts the door in many cases 
to the Federal courthouse, but also because the rationale for the presumption 
against extraterritoriality under Morrison—Congress is unconcerned with non-
domestic matters—does not on its face have any application to state courts 
deciding upon the reach of state law claims. Because this may lead to even more 
jurisdictions applying potentially conflicting laws, and because of the 
insensitivity of state courts to negative impacts on foreign relations from the 
application of their laws, Professor Florey is not sanguine about the prospect for 
more state litigation over events occurring abroad. Accordingly, Professor Florey 
proposes Federal and state responses to mitigate the problem. 
The other two articles in this symposium examine events in Europe, which 
may or may not fill the void left by Morrison. Specifically, these two articles 
look at the Dutch Collective Settlements Act (Wet Afwikkeling Collectieve 
Massachade or “WCAM”), which empowers an appellate court in Amsterdam to 
grant judgments enforcing settlement agreements for class or multiple actions 
brought out of the same event. In The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass 
Damages, Professor Bart Krans of the University of Groningen provides an 
upbeat introduction to the WCAM. As Professor Krans explains, the Dutch 
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statute will strike many as strange insofar as it provides a collective procedure for 
enforcement of settlement agreements, but no collective procedure for bringing 
the underlying claims—thereby raising the question of what provides the 
leverage for the settlement. Still, Professor Krans argues that experience has 
shown that this unusual approach has worked. By contrast, Professor Xandra E. 
Kramer of Erasmus University takes a more critical view of the Dutch statute 
insofar as it purports to bind non-Dutch parties to settlement agreements. The 
Dutch statute began as a tool to settle cases brought by Dutch victims of the drug, 
DES.6 It evolved, however, to encompass settlements of securities fraud cases 
involving primarily non-Dutch investors for fraud by non-Dutch corporations. 
Professor Kramer skeptically analyzes whether other nations in the European 
Union will be under any obligation to recognize the Dutch judgments in such 
cases. 
As mentioned above, my contribution to this symposium focuses on 
Morrison’s impact on the territorial reach of U.S. statutes beyond the Securities 
Exchange Act. Morrison provides more than simply another example in the 
growing list of decisions in which the Supreme Court invoked the presumption 
against extraterritoriality as the Court’s basis for deciding that U.S. law did not 
apply to events beyond our border.7 As recognized by the Supreme Court in its 
recent Kiobel decision, Morrison sets the standard for determining whether 
applying U.S. law to a situation in which some conduct or effect occurs inside the 
United States and some conduct or effect occurs outside the United States 
involves the extraterritorial application of U.S. law so as to trigger the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.8 In a world in which both the conduct and 
impact of regulated activities increasingly occur in more than one nation, 
deciding when applying U.S. law involves extraterritoriality and when it does not 
is of critical importance to the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Morrison answers the question of whether there is extraterritoriality through 
a “statutory focus” test: if the thing which is the focus of the statute happens in 
 
6. Students of tort law may recall that the DES cases presented an interesting causation problem insofar as 
the drug caused injury, but, because a number of manufacturers produced the identical drug and because years 
passed between pregnant women taking the drug and the later manifestation of injury in their adult children, it 
was commonly impossible for plaintiffs to prove which manufacturer actually produced the pills the particular 
plaintiff’s mother took. See generally O. Lee Reed, The DES Cases and Liability Without Causation, 19 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 511 (1981). Under these circumstances, the need for a collective settlement in which all manufacturers 
contribute in accordance to their share of the market and all plaintiffs collect out of the common pot is 
particularly compelling.  
7. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665; Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993); Smith v. 
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-204 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585-86 (1992) (Stevens, J. concurring) 
(concurring in the judgment on the basis of the presumption against extraterritoriality instead of standing); see 
infra notes 56-58 (pointing out the increasing use of the presumption against extraterritoriality by the Supreme 
Court after the Aramco decision in 1991 in contrast to the declining use previously). 
8. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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the United States, there is no extraterritoriality; if the thing which is the focus of 
the statute happens abroad, there is extraterritoriality.9 I critique this test as 
applied by Morrison. My conclusion is that the statutory focus test is utterly 
unworkable. I will propose an alternative approach in a future article.10 
My contribution to this symposium will proceed in two parts: Part II of this 
article lays the groundwork for my discussion of Morrison’s approach to 
determining extraterritoriality and carries out my responsibility as the organizer 
of this symposium by providing readers who are new to the topic with a brief 
background regarding the application of U.S. law to transnational securities 
frauds prior to Morrison and a discussion of the Morrison case. 
Part III of this article then looks at the impact of Morrison on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, and specifically how Morrison handled a 
situation in which events underlying the plaintiffs’ claim occurred both inside 
and outside the United States. It provides an introduction to the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, an explanation of the difficulty presented in 
determining whether there is extraterritoriality in applying a nation’s law to 
situations involving regulated conduct or effect occurring both inside and outside 
the nation, a discussion of how Morrison resolves this question, and an 
explanation of the fundamental flaw in the test the Court employs. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The introductory article in a symposium on transnational securities and 
regulatory litigation in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision 
owes it to those readers not already familiar with the topic to provide a little 
background about the law in the area prior to the Supreme Court’s decision and 
about the case itself. 
A. Application of U.S. Law to Transnational Securities Frauds pre Morrison 
Like much in this country that later conservative voices would condemn, 
application of U.S. securities laws to fraudulent transactions outside the United 
States started in the 1960s. In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the Second Circuit 
confronted a situation in which directors of a Canadian corporation allegedly 
defrauded their corporation by having it issue stock cheaply to a couple of other 
companies in Canada.11 This diluted the value of stock previously issued by the 
corporation, some of which traded on the American Stock Exchange, and 
 
9. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884-8 (2010). 
10. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WILL. & MARY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2014). 
11. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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triggered a lawsuit by shareholders in the United States.12 The shareholders 
asserted that the directors’ action violated Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act,13 and Rule 10b-514 promulgated by the Securities Exchange 
Commission pursuant to Section 10(b).15 The combination of this section and rule 
prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and courts 
hold that private parties injured by the violation have an implied cause of action 
against the wrongdoer.16 Figuring that the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act 
encompasses protecting investors trading on U.S. securities exchanges, the 
Second Circuit held that the Section 10(b) applied based upon the domestic effect 
even though the fraud occurred in Canada.17 
A few years later, the Second Circuit in Leasco Data Processing Equipment 
Corp. v. Maxwell, confronted a situation in which officials of an English 
company convinced an American company to purchase stock in the English 
company by misrepresentations taking place in the United States and in 
England.18 The Court again held that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could apply—
in this case based upon the occurrence of conduct (some of the 
misrepresentations) in the United States.19 The combination of Schoenbaum and 
Leasco created what became known as the conduct and effects test to determine 
the reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to securities fraud having 
a transnational dimension.20 Under this test, conduct or effects in the United 
States might—depending upon a balancing of factors21—subject a securities fraud 
to the reach of the U.S. prohibition. The test spread from the Second Circuit to 
the other circuits,22 albeit with some differences.23 
The early cases developing the conduct and effects test seem not to have 
provoked too much controversy. This changed over time. In part, increasingly 
 
12. Id. 
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b). 
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
15. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204. 
16. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.Supp. 798, 800 (E.D.Pa. 1947). 
17. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 209. 
18. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir. 1972). 
19. Id. at 1333. 
20. E.g., S.E.C. v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003). 
21. E.g., Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 129-
31 (2d Cir. 1998) (balancing various factors in holding that Section 10(b) did not apply); e.g., Continental Grain 
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that the test looks at a 
number of factors with no one factor dispositive). 
22. E.g., Fed. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116; e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. 
Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); e.g., Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 414; Grunenthal GmbH v. 
Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1983). 
23. E.g., Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665 (“The predominant difference among the circuits, it appears, is the 
degree to which the American-based conduct must be related causally to the fraud and the resultant harm to 
justify the application of American securities law.”). 
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aggressive applications of the conduct and effects test provoked reaction. This 
was particularly true with the use of the test to reach so-called F-cubed cases—
those in which the plaintiffs were foreigners, the defendant was a foreign 
corporation, and the purchases or sales of securities took place on foreign 
securities markets.24 Under these circumstances, critics asked what possible 
interest the United States had in applying its securities fraud law to the plaintiffs’ 
claims simply by virtue of the fact that some of the conduct in creating or 
promulgating the false or misleading statements took place in the United States.25 
A second source of reaction arose out of cases in which application of U.S. 
law highlighted policy tensions. In a case like Leasco in which a solitary 
defrauded investor sued the company that lied to it,26 no one outside of the 
defendant was likely to be too upset by the application of U.S. securities laws. 
With large shareholder class actions against prominent foreign corporations, 
however, hostile reaction arose.27 This is not surprising, since such class actions 
have been controversial in this country.28 Exacerbating the problem are 
differences in substantive (such as the fraud on the market presumption29) and 
procedural (with regard to such matters as class actions and contingency fees30) 
laws governing such actions in the United States versus the laws elsewhere. 
 
24. See, e.g., Danielle Kantor, Note: The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-cubed Case: 
Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 839, 841 
(2010) (discussing F-cubed cases). 
25. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities 
Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 493-96 (2009) (arguing that including purchasers on foreign 
stock markets in securities fraud class actions is unnecessary to protect the interests of U.S. investors or the 
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act). 
26. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir. 1972). 
27. See, e.g., Staff of the Securities Exchange Commission, Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the 
Private Right of Action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as Required by Section 929Y 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 23-24 (Apr. 2012) (quoting amicus briefs 
filed in Morrison by the British, French and Australian governments, which criticized the United States 
allowing class actions seeking recovery for securities frauds in connection with trading shares on their markets). 
28. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-forming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006) (“The standard criticism from the business 
community, the corporate bar, and some academics has long been that securities class actions disproportionately 
assert ‘frivolous’ claims and thereby reduce shareholder welfare on average.”). 
29. The fraud on the market presumption allows purchasers or sellers of securities in well-developed 
markets to claim indirect reliance on false statements they may never have heard based upon the theory that 
such statements impacted the price paid or received by the investors. The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted this 
presumption, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988), but other nations have rejected it. E.g., 
Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the 
Supreme Court’s “Transactional Test,” 52 VA. J. INT’L. L. 405, 414 (2012). 
30. E.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Implied “Consent” to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class 
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 619, 625, 628 (2004) (describing systems in other countries without U.S. 
style class actions); e.g., Ventoruzzo, supra note 29, at 412 (describing the impact on securities fraud litigation 
of differences between the U.S. opt-out class actions and the collective actions in other nations in which 
members must affirmatively opt into the class, and contingency fees in the United States). 
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A final source of reaction arose out of the objection that the conduct and 
effects test lacked clear definition and had devolved into ad hoc and 
unpredictable judicial decisions.31 This last complaint loomed especially large in 
persuading the Supreme Court to seek a simpler test in Morrison. 
B. Morrison 
Morrison was an F-cubed case: the plaintiffs were Australians, who 
purchased stock in an Australian banking company, through transactions on the 
Australian stock market.32 We can blame events in Florida for the case being in 
the United States. The Australian banking company (National Australia Bank) 
had purchased a Florida firm, which conducted a business servicing mortgages. 
A principal asset of such a business is the contracts it has to service mortgages. 
The value of these contracts, in turn, partially depends on how long the 
mortgages covered by the contracts will run. The executives of the Florida firm 
overestimated how long the mortgages would run before homeowners refinanced 
their mortgages, thereby significantly overestimating the value of the firm’s 
mortgage servicing contracts. Because the National Australia Bank bought the 
Florida firm, this inflated value showed up on the financial reports which the 
bank filed in Australia. Eventually, as homeowners refinanced their mortgages 
faster than the Florida firm’s executives predicted, National Australia Bank was 
forced to write down the value of the contracts held by the Florida firm, leading 
the bank’s stock price to tumble. This, in turn, led parties who bought shares in 
the Australian bank to sue in U.S. court alleging violation of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5. They claimed that the executives of the Florida firm had deliberately 
exaggerated the expected life of the mortgages and the value of the mortgage 
servicing contracts.33 
To the lower courts applying the conduct and effects test, the issue was 
where the fraudulent conduct took place. The plaintiffs argued it took place in 
Florida, where the executives overestimated the expected life of the mortgages 
and the value of its contracts.34 The lower courts, however, viewed the fraudulent 
conduct as occurring in Australia, where the bank incorporated the 
overvaluations into the financial reports it made public.35 As a result, the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the case and the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.36 
 
31. E.g., Choi & Silberman, supra note 25, at 467. 
32. Which a wag might say makes Morrison an A-cubed or AAA case. 
33. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2875-76 (2010) (providing the factual 
background and procedural history). 
34. Id. at 2883. 
35. Id. at 2876. 
36. The District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reflecting the way in which the 
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs found an even less 
hospitable reception. All the justices agreed the plaintiffs should lose. The 
dispute within the Court involved why. A concurring opinion by Justices Stevens 
and Ginsburg agreed with the lower courts that the case simply failed under the 
conduct and effects test.37 The majority of the Supreme Court justices, in an 
opinion written by Justice Scalia, took a broader approach to the problem. The 
majority opinion rejected the entire conduct and effects test. Instead, the majority 
ruled that Section 10(b) did not apply unless the plaintiffs purchased or sold 
securities in the United States.38 
In creating this new rule, the majority opinion proclaimed reliance on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. This required the majority to reject 
arguments that (1) various provisions in the Securities Exchange Act rebutted the 
presumption against extraterritoriality,39 (2) that the presumption did not apply 
because of the conduct in Florida, and (3) that various policies favored a version 
of the conduct and effects test suggested by the Solicitor General.40 
III. MORRISON AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Morrison’s significance transcends the question of whether U.S. securities 
law will reach securities fraud in connection with overseas purchases or sales of 
securities. The reason lies in the Supreme Court’s reliance on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Developing this point requires an introduction to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, an explanation of the problem courts face 
 
courts, before Morrison, had characterized the issue of whether Section 10(b) reached actions outside the 
United States. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison characterized the matter as a merits issue (whether 
Section 10(b) prohibited the activity in question given where it took place), rather than a subject matter 
jurisdiction question (whether the nature of the matter was one that a federal court could hear), since federal 
courts have jurisdiction to hear cases involving the federal securities laws. Id. Contributing to the complexity in 
terminology in this area is the use of the term “prescriptive jurisdiction” to refer to the power of a nation to 
create law governing events beyond its borders. E.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States [“Restatement of Foreign Relations Law”] § 401. 
37. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
38. Id. at 2888. 
39. The majority dismissed the arguments that the presumption was rebutted by: (1) the language of 
Section 10(b), which triggered application of the section upon using a means of interstate commerce (defined to 
include commerce between foreign nations and any state); (2) the prefatory section of the Securities Exchange 
Act mentioning that prices set on U.S. securities exchanges are quoted in foreign countries; and (3) Section 
30(a) and (b), which showed an intent for the Securities Exchange Act to reach transactions outside the United 
States. Id. at 2877-78. The court relied on the precedent of EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 
U.S. 244 (1991), in ignoring the so-called jurisdictional language of Section 10(b) as not to be taken seriously. 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78. The implication of the language in the act’s prefatory section on the reach of 
Section 10(b) is obscure. The Court, however, misunderstood Section 30(a) and (b). See infra notes 117-120 
and accompanying text. 
40. The Solicitor General proposed certain qualifiers on when conduct in the United States would be 
sufficient to trigger the statute and argued that the applying the statute to situations in which such conduct exists 
would help promote honest markets in the United States and prevent the United States from becoming a 
Barbary Coast from which persons direct fraud at foreign markets. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887-88. 
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in deciding whether this presumption applies in situations, like Morrison, in 
which some conduct or effects occurs both within and outside the United States, 
and an exploration of the test the Court employed in Morrison for making this 
determination. 
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
In a simpler time, issues of applying U.S. law beyond the young nation’s 
borders arose on ships, and involved pirates,41 murder at sea,42 and customs 
duties.43 By the Twentieth Century, an industrialized and powerful United States 
was dealing with those who used subtler means to enrich themselves at the 
expense of others. Congress responded with statutes to protect consumers, 
competitors, workers, investors, and the like.44 As economic transactions 
increasingly crossed national boundaries, issues arose regarding the degree to 
which such statutes applied to events that occurred in other nations. Courts 
responded with decisions applying or refusing to apply U.S. antitrust laws,45 
employment laws,46 securities laws,47 trademark law,48 as well as a variety of other 
laws,49 to activities abroad. 
In the course of deciding these cases, the Supreme Court often referred to 
rules of construction or presumptions regarding Congress’ intent with respect to 
applying U.S. laws to events beyond our borders. So, in its early decisions 
dealing with murder at sea and enforcing customs duties, the Supreme Court 
explained that even though a statute used broad, general language regarding its 
reach, the Court presumed that Congress only intended to legislate within 
Congress’ “authority and jurisdiction;”50 albeit it is debatable whether this 
referred to legislating only with respect to events within the territory of the 
 
41. E.g., United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820). 
42. E.g., United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
43. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 368-69 (1824). 
44. E.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (protecting consumers and competitors from 
combinations in restraint of trade and monopolization); e.g., Eight Hour Law, 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-25 (1940) 
(protecting workers through wage and hour regulation); e.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et. seq. 
(protecting investors). 
45. See infra note 54 and accompanying text; see F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 
155, 164 (2004). 
46. See infra note 55 and accompanying text; see Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational 
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 617-27 (1990) (discussing 
cases dealing with extraterritorial application of U.S. employment law). 
47. See supra Part II.A. 
48. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 290 (1952). 
49. E.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 198 (1993) (Federal Torts Claim Act); e.g., Turley, supra 
note 46, at 627-33 (discussing cases dealing with extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental protection 
laws). 
50. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824). 
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United States or legislating only within the limits imposed by international law 
on the permissible reach of a nation’s statutes.51 Justice Holmes’ opinion in 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.52 marked an important point in the 
evolution of the law in this area when he stated that the presumed limit is one of 
territory. Specifically, Justice Holmes asserted that the legality of an act nearly 
universally depends upon the law of the nation in which it takes place, which, in 
turn, leads courts to construe statutes only to apply within the nation’s territorial 
limits.53 
Justice Holmes’ strict notions of territoriality subsequently fell out of favor in 
the very field in which American Banana arose, as courts increasingly applied 
U.S. antitrust laws to overseas conduct that had an effect in the United States.54 In 
employment law, however, the Supreme Court continued to invoke a 
presumption against applying U.S. laws to events beyond our territory 
(extraterritoriality) in order to construe U.S. law as not reaching labor practices 
outside the United States.55 This hit an important milestone in the Court’s 1991 
decision in E.E.O.C. v Arabian American Oil Co (Aramco),56 in which the 
Supreme Court invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality in order to 
hold that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act did not apply to the 
discriminatory firing of an American citizen by an American company, when the 
firing took place in Saudi Arabia. Aramco marked a turning point in the 
frequency with which the Supreme Court invoked the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Whereas, the eight decades between American Banana and 
Aramco saw the Supreme Court decreasingly invoke the presumption to restrict 
the application of U.S. statutes,57 in the two decades since Aramco the 
presumption has found much greater favor in the Supreme Court’s eyes—up 
through and including its invocation in Morrison.58 
The growing fondness of the Supreme Court toward the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has, not surprisingly, brought the attention of scholars to the 
 
51. E.g., John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 351, 363-66 
(2010). 
52. 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).  
53. Id. at 357. 
54. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993); e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales 
Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 271 (1927); e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
55. E.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (holding that the Eight Hour Law did not apply 
to employment overseas). 
56. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
57. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 85, 91 (1998) (The Supreme Court did not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality in the four 
decades after applying it to the Eight Hour Day law in 1949 even though it had opportunities to do so). 
58. Id. at 87 (listing Supreme Court opinions invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality in the 
decade following Aramco). Just recently, the Supreme Court invoked the presumption in order to limit the reach 
of claims under the Alien Tort Statue. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013). 
01_GEVURTZ & INTRODUCTION_MASTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015 12:50 PM 
2014 / An Examination of Morrison’s Impact on the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
184 
topic.59 While these scholars disagree regarding what the Court should do with 
the presumption,60 on one point there seems widespread agreement: the Supreme 
Court has made a hash of the subject.61 Inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions 
abound. Some opinions rely on the presumption, while other opinions dealing 
with application of U.S. law to events beyond the nation’s borders barely, if at 
all, mention it.62 The Court cannot make up its mind about the purposes for the 
presumption.63 The Court’s opinions differ on the evidence of legislative intent 
necessary to overcome the presumption.64 Finally, Supreme Court opinions are 
confusing or inconsistent regarding when a claim involves extraterritoriality so as 
to trigger the presumption.65 While Morrison illustrates many of these problems, 
its primary significance lies in its effort to define when a claim involves 
extraterritoriality.66 
 
59. See generally Yaad Rotem, Economic Regulation and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality—A 
New Justification, 3 WM & MARY POL’Y REV. 229 (2012); see generally Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified 
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011); see generally Lea Brilmayer, New 
Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655 (2011); see generally Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual 
Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
110 (2010); see generally Knox, supra note 51; see generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality and 
the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631 (2009); see generally Austen Parrish, The 
Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008); see generally Dodge, supra 
note 57; see generally Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance 
Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 750 (1995). 
60. E.g., Colangelo, supra note 59, at 1022 (advocating that courts limit the presumption to situations in 
which the law comes from unilateral (domestic) as opposed to multilateral (international) sources); e.g., Meyer, 
supra note, 59 at 119 (advocating that courts limit the presumption to situations in which only one nation 
prohibits the conduct); e.g., Knox, supra note 51, at 353 (advocating that courts base the presumption on 
international law rules regarding jurisdiction to apply a nation’s law); e.g., Parrish, supra note 59, at 1462 
(advocating that courts reject the effects test as a basis for extending the reach of U.S. laws); e.g., Dodge, supra 
note 57, at 90 (advocating that courts base the presumption on the absence of effects in the United States). 
61. E.g., Colangelo, supra note 59, at 1021, 1028 (arguing that the only thing the scholars writing on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality agree on is that the law on the subject is a mess). 
62. E.g., Kramer, supra note 59, at 752-53 (contrasting Aramco with Hartford Fire Ins. Co. in which the 
Supreme Court does not explicitly mention the presumption). 
63. Compare Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) (stating that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is not about comity or avoiding conflicts with other nations’ laws), with 
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Aramco’s statement that the presumption against extraterritoriality “serves 
to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord”). 
64. E.g., Dodge, supra note 57, at 96-97 (discussing statements by the Supreme Court in Aramco, Smith 
v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201-04 (1993), and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176-77 
(1993), with different formulations for the amount of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption). 
65. Beyond the problem addressed in this article with the Supreme Court’s approach to situations 
involving conduct or effect in more than one nation, the court has been inconsistent with respect to whether 
ships or bases constitute U.S. territory for purposes of determining extraterritoriality. E.g., Knox, supra note 51, 
at 390-92. 
66. See infra Part III.B. 
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B. The Problem of Identifying Extraterritoriality 
The majority opinion in Morrison stated that it based its result on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. The concurring opinion in Morrison, by 
contrast, viewed the presumption as largely irrelevant. This illustrates that a 
pivotal question in the case was what constitutes extraterritoriality so as to the 
trigger the presumption. To the concurring opinion, the Second Circuit’s test did 
not involve extraterritoriality because the Second Circuit’s test predicated 
application of Section 10(b) on a nexus between the prohibited acts and the 
territory of the United States—specifically that either the prohibited conduct or 
the effect of the prohibited conduct occur in the United States. To the plaintiffs in 
Morrison, the case before the court did not involve extraterritoriality because the 
fraud originated in Florida. To the majority, however, the case involved 
extraterritoriality because the purchase of securities in reliance on the fraud 
occurred in Australia.67 
1. A Simple Introduction to Territoriality and Extraterritoriality 
To understand these various positions, it is useful to step back from the 
dispute in Morrison and consider the problem more generally. To do so, it helps 
to use a simple example: defendant shoots and kills victim. Normally, the nation 
in which the killing takes place applies its law to prosecute the defendant for 
murder, reflecting the traditional approach under which laws govern events 
taking place within the nation’s territory.68 
Nations, however, sometimes might prosecute the defendant even if the 
killing took place in another nation. This might occur, for example, because the 
victim was a citizen of the nation seeking to prosecute (sometimes referred to as 
the passive personality principle);69 or because the defendant is a citizen of the 
nation seeking to prosecute (referred to as the nationality or active personality 
principle);70 or because of some special interest of the nation in the shooting (say 
 
67. See supra Part II.B. 
68. E.g., Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 36, at § 402, cmt. c (“The territorial principle 
is by far the most common basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe.”); e.g., International Bar 
Association, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/. [hereinafter “IBA Report”] (“The starting point for jurisdiction is that all [nations] have 
competence over events occurring and persons . . . present in their territory. This principle, known as the 
‘principle of territoriality,’ is the most common and least controversial basis for jurisdiction.”). Include within 
the term “nation” are political subdivisions of nations, such as “states” within the United States of America, that 
prosecute crimes such as murder committed within the political subdivision. 
69. E.g., Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 36, at § 402 cmt. g; e.g., IBA Report, supra 
note 68, at 147 (“Of the 27 [nations] surveyed for this chapter, just over half adopted some version of the 
passive personality principle of jurisdiction, although generally only for certain crimes.”). 
70. E.g., Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 36, at § 402(2); e.g., IBA Report, supra note 
68, at 145 (“Almost all (25 out of 27) of the [nations] surveyed for this chapter grant some degree of jurisdiction 
to their courts based on the active personality principle, in the sense of criminalising certain conduct by 
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the victim was undertaking an important task for the government of the nation 
seeking to prosecute; in which case the nation would be asserting jurisdiction 
based upon what is often referred to as the protective principle);71 or because of 
the special nature of the crime (say the murder was part of a campaign to 
eliminate all persons of the victim’s religion; in which case the nation would be 
asserting jurisdiction to prosecute based upon what is referred to as universal 
jurisdiction).72 In any of these cases in which the nation seeks to prosecute a 
killing that took place in another nation, one can say that the nation is applying 
its law extraterritorially. 
Applying the concept of extraterritoriality becomes less straightforward as 
events straddle borders. In the classic example, the defendant, who is standing in 
one nation, shoots a rifle and kills the intended victim, who is standing near the 
border in another nation. Now, in which nation’s territory does the wrong occur: 
the nation of the act or the nation of the injury? While some early court opinions 
talked of this as a situation in which the defendant’s conduct occurred in both 
nations—based upon the metaphysical notion that the defendant’s conduct 
traveled with the bullet73—the general view is that this situation involves conduct 
in one nation (where the defendant pulled the trigger) and an effect in another 
nation (where the bullet struck the victim).74 Hence, this example illustrates that 
prohibited conduct may have a connection to a territory either by occurring there 
or by creating an effect there. Moreover, whether one views the situation through 
the lens of where conduct and effect occur, or through the lens of where the 
necessary elements of a crime took place, the example shows that situations can 
arise in which one might say that a prohibited act occurs in more than one nation. 
In such an event, the critical question for purposes of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is whether either nation would be applying its law 
extraterritorially if, in this example, it prosecuted the shooter for murder. 
There are three answers to this question: yes, no, and maybe. The affirmative 
answer follows from what I will label the “half-empty” viewpoint because it 
requires all contacts to be within a single nation in order to establish territoriality. 
 
nationals under domestic law.”). 
71. E.g., Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 36, at § 402(3); e.g., IBA Report, supra note 
68, at 150 (“Of the 27 [nations] surveyed for this chapter, 22 have enacted legislation based on some form of the 
protective principle.”). 
72. E.g., Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 36, at § 404; e.g., IBA Report, supra note 68, 
at 153 (“A majority of the [nations] surveyed for this chapter (25 out of 27) provide for some form of universal 
jurisdiction to be exercised by national courts.”). 
73. See, e.g., Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1893) (“[I]f a man in the state of South Carolina 
criminally fires a ball into the state of Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the ball, and as being 
represented by it, up to the point where it strikes.”). 
74. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18 illustration 2 
(1965); see generally, e.g., STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (2006) 
(referring to subjective and objective territoriality as where the act and the injury occur, respectively). 
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Under this view, both nations in the cross-border shooting example would be 
applying their law extraterritorially if they prosecuted the defendant for murder 
because they would be prosecuting a crime of which some of the conduct or 
effect (or the elements) took place in another nation.75 At the other extreme is 
what I will label the “half-full” viewpoint because it requires only some contact 
within a nation in order to establish territoriality. Under this view, neither of the 
nations in the cross-border shooting example would be applying law 
extraterritorially if either prosecuted the defendant for murder because, for both, 
at least some the conduct or effect (or elements) of the crime took place in that 
nation.76 In between these two viewpoints are middle grounds. Under such middle 
grounds, one nation might be applying its law extraterritorially and one might 
not. For example, a highly traditional view would be that a nation punishing 
conduct (pulling the trigger) within the nation’s territory would not be applying 
its law extraterritorially, while a nation punishing conduct that occurred 
elsewhere would be applying its law extraterritorially, even though the conduct 
elsewhere produced an effect (the death) within the nation’s territory.77 
2. Applying the Concepts to Transnational Securities Fraud and Situations 
Introducing Greater Complexity 
Turning from murder to securities fraud, it is easy to imagine a parallel to the 
cross-border shooting example: a person may send a false or misleading 
communication from one country to a recipient in another country, and the 
recipient acts upon the communication to purchase a security. Indeed, a review of 
one’s email inbox may suggest that cross-border fraudulent solicitations are far 
more frequent than cross-border shootings.78 The situation facing the Second 
Circuit in Leasco—from which, as stated above,79 stemmed the conduct 
component in the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects test—provides an 
example: the defendant in England made false or misleading statements in 
transatlantic telephone calls and mailings to the plaintiff in the United States. 
Actually, things in Leasco were more complicated than a simple cross-border 
fraudulent solicitation. In addition to the calls and mailings from England to the 
 
75. E.g., Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.3 (1992) (using the term extraterritoriality to refer to a case in which at least 
one relevant event occurs in another nation). 
76. See, e.g., Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 36, at § 402(1)(2), cmt. d (treating 
situations in which either conduct or effect occurs within a nation as creating jurisdiction to apply a nation’s law 
based upon territoriality). 
77. E.g., Parrish, supra note 59, at 1456 (discussing traditional approach under which application of a 
statute based upon effects, but not conduct, is extraterritorial). 
78. It is amazing how many large estates are going unclaimed in other nations, a share of which can be 
yours for only $5,000. 
79. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
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United States,80 the defendant’s representatives also made false or misleading 
statements to the plaintiff’s representatives during meetings that took place both 
in the United States and in England (where the plaintiff’s representatives agreed 
to purchase the stock). The facts in Morrison also illustrate complexity in 
locating the fraudulent conduct. As stated earlier,81 the fraud originated in Florida 
with the executives of the Australian bank’s Florida subsidiary allegedly 
manipulating estimates to make the subsidiary’s assets appear more valuable than 
they were. The Australian bank incorporated its subsidiary’s overestimate in the 
bank’s financial statements, which the bank released in Australia (but also in the 
United States, since the bank’s American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) were 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange).82 Executives of the subsidiary also 
allegedly made misleading statements in Florida touting the subsidiary’s 
prospects. One could argue, as the lower courts in Morrison did, that the conduct 
in Florida did not directly lead to the plaintiffs’ reliance in Australia so as to be 
the source of the effect in Australia. The notion is that the fraud concocted in 
Florida does not hurt the plaintiffs who bought their stock in Australia until the 
bank repeats it in Australia.83 Of course, if there is no fraud in Florida, there is 
nothing misleading for the bank to repeat in Australia.84 
Not only can it be challenging to decide where the relevant conduct occurs in 
a securities fraud, but locating the effects also can get tricky. In Schoenbaum, as 
mentioned above,85 a fraud practiced on a Canadian corporation by its directors 
involved the low-price issuance of stock in Canada. The rather indirect effect in 
the United States was to dilute the value of shares in the Canadian company 
trading on the American Stock Exchange. In Leasco, one might ask whether the 
effect of the misrepresentations is the purchase of shares in England, or the 
depletion of the U.S. plaintiff’s bank account in the United States resulting from 
 
80. Which the court, perhaps harkening back to the archaic view that the shooter’s conduct traveled with 
the bullet, treated as conduct in the United States. 
81. See supra Part II.B. 
82. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Commission, Form 20-f, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/form20-f.pdf (providing the form for registering ADRs listed on a national stock exchange, which 
includes financial reporting requirements). ADRs give their owners the right to convert them into stock in the 
company. Foreign companies, like National Australia Bank, often issue and list ADRs, instead of their stock, in 
securities markets in the United States. 
83. Morrison v. Australia National Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008). The parallel might be to 
one who loads the rifle in one jurisdiction and fires it in another. 
84. It might be easier to deny a connection between the plaintiffs’ trades in Australia and the misleading 
statements by the Florida subsidiary’s executives or the misleading filings by the bank in the United States. 
Even here, however, a causal link probably exists, since, with global communication, someone presumably 
would have noticed the inconsistency if the bank’s U.S. filings or the executives’ statements had not matched 
the bank’s Australian misstatements. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under 
Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 44-48 (2007) 
(discussing the impact of fraudulent representations in the United States on prices in foreign markets). 
85. See supra Part II.A. 
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purchasing shares that were not worth what the defendant led the plaintiff to 
believe.86 
While economic crimes, such as securities fraud or antitrust violations,87 
commonly involve complex situations in which both the conduct and effect of the 
prohibited acts might occur in a number of jurisdictions, it does not take much 
imagination to change the simple cross-border shooting example before it too 
starts raising troubling issues in determining the location of the relevant conduct 
or effect. For instance, instead of a shooting, consider a bombing: one defendant 
assembles the bomb in one nation and brings it to a second defendant in a second 
nation, who then mails it from the second nation to the victim in a third nation, 
where the bomb explodes; assume, however, the victim survives until being 
moved to a fourth nation where the victim dies, leaving orphaned children in a 
fifth nation. If all five nations sought to prosecute, which, if any, would be 
attempting to apply law extraterritorially? 
3. The Need for Goldilocks 
The potential for an ever expanding territorial connection based upon some 
attenuated conduct or effect occurring in the United States led the majority 
opinion in Morrison to reject the notion that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is irrelevant so long as some conduct or effect occurs in the 
United States. Actually, the Second Circuit in its conduct and effects test did not 
reject a role for a presumption regarding the reach of statutes so long as there is 
some conduct or effect in the United States. Instead, the Second Circuit stated 
that it presumed Congress would not wish to apply the Securities Exchange Act 
based upon so little conduct or effect in the United States that this would offend 
what the Second Circuit referred to as foreign relations law88—by which the  
 
 
86. See supra Part II.A. 
87. Kramer, supra note 59 at 751-52 (pointing out that prior to the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in 
Hartford Fire Insurance, the Supreme Court had only applied to Sherman Act to conduct outside the United 
States in cases in which some of the anticompetitive conduct also occurred inside the United States); Case C-
89/85, Åhls Tröm Osakeyhtiö v. Comm’n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5243 [Wood Pulp] (holding that price fixing by 
wood pulp producers outside the European Union violated European Union law when the conspiracy was 
implemented (by selling at the illegally agreed prices) in the European Union). The classic antitrust case 
imposing liability for overseas conduct based upon effects in the United States employed a highly expansive 
view of effects. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). In the 
relevant portion of the case, the court condemned a cartel of foreign producers of aluminum who agreed to limit 
production. Even though the limit covered only production of aluminum outside the United States, the court 
held that this overseas conduct created an effect in the United States because less worldwide supply of 
aluminum would mean higher aluminum prices in the United States. Id. 
88. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (“absent 
the clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go beyond the limits recognized by 
foreign relations law”). 
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court meant the principles laid out in the Restatement of this title.89 Hence, no one 
was really asserting a “half-full” viewpoint in Morrison. 
On the other hand, no one was really arguing for a “half-empty” viewpoint 
either. Even the majority opinion in Morrison did not argue that any conduct or 
effect outside the United States triggered the presumption against 
extraterritorially. The reason for this is pretty obvious: If each nation’s courts 
apply a presumption against extraterritoriality whenever any conduct or effect 
occurs in another nation, then no nation might prosecute cross-border 
misconduct, such as the classic cross-border shooting example, in the all too 
common
90
 situation in which legislatures neglect to specify the territorial reach of 
statutes (which, of course, is why one has the presumption). Not only is this a 
poor result as a policy matter, but also it is difficult to imagine that this is what 
legislatures have in mind.91 
Moreover, the potentially expansive reach of conduct and effects in an era of 
globalization is a double-edged sword. The majority in Morrison feared that 
plaintiffs could often point to some minor conduct or effects in the United States 
in order to render the presumption a timid watchdog against extraterritoriality. 
On the other hand, with globalization, defendants can often point to some minor 
conduct or effects outside the United States with the hope of turning the 
presumption into a pit bull attacking reasonable efforts to apply U.S law. Hence, 
lest some minor conduct or effects either inside or outside the United States too 
easily defuse or trigger the presumption, we need to search for a reasonable 
middle ground between the “half-empty” and “half-full” viewpoints. 
C.  Morrison’s Statutory Focus Test for Identifying Extraterritoriality 
The opinion for the Court in Morrison invoked a test of statutory “focus” in 
order to resolve when a claim involves extraterritoriality: if the event which is the 
focus of the statute occurs in this country, there is no extraterritoriality, if the 
event which is the focus of the statute occurs abroad, there is.92 In applying this 
test to the situation before it, the Court in Morrison decided that the focus of the 
 
89. Id. (looking to sufficient conduct in the United States under the examples set out in the Second 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law); Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas 
London, 147 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 
reasonableness criteria).  
90. At least in common law jurisdictions. Kenneth S. Gallant, The Indeterminate International Law of 
Jurisdiction, the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Effect of Statutes, and Certainty in U.S. Criminal Law, 
27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. AND DEV. L.J. 219 (2014).  
91. Indeed, after an English court once held that neither nation could prosecute when a blow was struck in 
one country and death ensued in another country, the English Parliament passed legislation to overturn this rule. 
E.g., S.S. Lotus, (France v. Turkey) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 65, 73 (Moore, J. dissenting) (relating this 
example). 
92. See generally Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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Section 10(b)’s prohibition of fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities is the purchase or sale.93 Hence, Section 10(b) reaches fraud in 
connection with purchases or sales of securities in the United States, but, 
following the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court presumed 
Congress did not intend Section 10(b) to reach fraud in connection with 
purchases or sales of securities outside the United States—as in the stock 
purchases by the Morrison plaintiffs in Australia.94 
This, however, raises the question of how the Court decides what is the focus 
of the statute; in other words, if statutory focus provides the test for determining 
extraterritoriality, what is the test for determining statutory focus? Unfortunately, 
the Court in Morrison provided no general standards, but instead simply made a 
determination for the statute before it.95 Hence, we must examine how the Court 
in Morrison decided that the focus of the Section 10(b)’s prohibition of fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities is the purchase or sale (rather 
than the fraud) and from this example deduce what it means to be the focus of the 
statute for purposes of determining extraterritoriality. 
1. Morrison’s Method for Identifying the Statutory Focus 
Morrison identified the purchase or sale of securities as the focus of Section 
10(b) based upon five arguments.96 The first is simply that Section 10(b) only 
penalizes fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.97 This, 
however, simply begs the question. While it is true that Section 10(b) does not 
penalize fraud that is not in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, the 
section also does not address the purchase or sale of a security without fraud.98 
This does not tell us as between the fraud and the purchase or sale, which is the 
dog and which is the tail (or which is the focus, to use the Court’s language).99 
Next, the Court pointed to the statute’s prologue (not to mention the statute’s 
title), which makes it clear that Congress intended in the Securities Exchange Act 
to regulate national (in other words U.S.) securities exchanges.100 One pesky 
problem with this argument is that Section 10(b) is expressly not limited to 
exchange traded securities, as Congress painfully made clear by stating that the 
section covers fraud in connection with “the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.”101 
 
93. See id. at 2884. 
94. See id. at 2885. 
95. See generally id. 
96. See infra Part III.C.2. 
97. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2887. 
98. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices Act, 17 CFR 240.10b-5 (2013). 
99. See id. 
100. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2881-82. 
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010). The Court is stretching in its footnote rejoinder that Congress must have 
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The Court also invoked Section 30(a) and (b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act,102 which, the Court argued, shows that Congress did not intend the act to 
reach transactions outside the United States unless specifically provided in a 
regulation.103 Section 30(a) prohibits a broker or dealer from effecting 
transactions in securities of U.S. companies on foreign securities exchanges in 
violation of regulations promulgated by the SEC to prevent evasion of the 
Securities Exchange Act.104 Section 30(b) provides that the Securities Exchange 
Act does not apply to “any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities 
without the jurisdiction of the United States,” unless the person does so in 
violation of the SEC regulations referred to in Section 30(a).105 At first glance, 
these provisions seem to support Morrison’s result, and, indeed, one may wonder 
why it was even necessary for the Court to invoke the presumption against 
extraterritoriality instead of simply citing Section 30(b) for the proposition that 
the Securities Exchange Act does not apply to transactions outside the United 
States unless the SEC has promulgated a regulation specifically calling for such 
application. 
A more careful reading of Section 30(b), however, reveals that the section 
does not prevent provisions of the Securities Exchange Act from applying to 
transactions outside the United States; rather it precludes provisions of the act 
from applying to “any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities” 
outside the United States.106 In Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit consulted the 
definitions section of the Securities Exchange Act—always a good idea—and 
concluded that Section 30(b)’s reference to a person who “transacts a business in 
securities” refers to brokers, dealers, and banks.107 Hence, Section 30(b) is 
 
meant domestic transactions when referring in Section 10(b) to the purchase or sale of any security not 
registered on a national securities exchange, because otherwise it would have been simpler for the section just to 
say the purchase or sale of any security. The obvious flaw in this rejoinder is that it would have been simpler for 
Congress to say the purchase or sale of any security in the United States if the reason Congress used this 
verbose language was to indicate that it only wanted to cover domestic transactions. A more likely rationale for 
what is obviously a long-winded way of saying the purchase or sale of any security is to make it clear that 
Congress meant Section 10(b) to reach any security whether registered or not, which is different from many 
other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. E.g., Securities Exchange Act, §§ 12(a) (registration 
requirement for companies listing shares on a national securities exchange), 14(a) (proxy solicitation rules for 
companies with shares listed on a national securities exchange), 16(b) (dealing with short swing trades by 
insiders of companies with shares listed on a national securities exchange); e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(a), 78n(a), 
78p(b) (1934). 
102. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2885. 
103. Id. 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a). 
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b). 
106. See generally id. 
107. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968). Specifically, Section 3(4) of the 
Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78c(4)) defines a broker as “any person engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” Section 3(5) (15 U.S.C. § 78c(5)) defines a dealer 
as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account.” 
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creating an exemption to the Securities Exchange Act’s regulation of brokers, 
dealers and banks when they conduct securities operations outside the United 
States.108 Section 30(a), in turn, is authorizing the SEC to issue regulations 
creating exceptions to the exemption if the SEC determines that brokers or 
dealers are exploiting the exemption in 30(b) to evade the act when conducting 
overseas trading in securities issued by U.S. companies.109 None of this supports 
the argument that Section 30(a) and (b) shows an intent by Congress that the 
Securities Exchange Act’s provisions generally not apply to transactions 
overseas; on the contrary, if, as the Morrison court presumed, Congress intended 
the overall Securities Exchange Act not to apply to securities transactions abroad 
then it is impossible to understand why Congress would have found it necessary 
specifically to exclude the actions of brokers, dealers, and banks insofar as they 
conduct their business outside the United States from the act, and Section 30(b) is 
useless.110 
 
Critically, Section 3(5) excludes from the definition of a dealer “a person that buys or sells securities . . . for 
such person’s own account, but not as a part of a regular business.” This distinction between persons who buy 
and sell securities for their own account as part of a business (dealers) and persons who buy and sell securities 
for their own account, but not as part of a regular business, (not dealers) makes it clear that the person who 
“transacts a business in securities” language in Section 30(b) does not encompass ordinary investors who 
purchase or sell a security (such as the plaintiffs in Morrison). Nor, of course, is a non-trading corporation, such 
as National Australia Bank, which files misleading financial reports, a person who transacts a business in 
securities. Both the definition of broker and the definition of dealer in Section 3 expressly exclude banks even 
when banks engage in the business of making various securities transactions that would otherwise bring them 
within the definition of a broker or dealer. Based upon this, Schoenbaum concluded that the reason Section 
30(b) used the person who “transacts a business in securities” language instead of just saying brokers and 
dealers is to include banks in the exemption from coverage under the act when the banks conduct securities 
operations outside the United States. See id. 
108. Id. 
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b). 
110. This explanation of Section 30(a) and (b) not only shows that these provisions do not support the 
court’s focus argument, but also explains the argument that Section 30(b), in fact, rebuts the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Specifically, while Section 30(b) shows Congress wished to limit the reach of the 
Securities Exchange Act with respect to certain transactions abroad, it also shows that Congress assumed that 
provisions of the act could reach transactions abroad and expressly prevented that when, with brokers, dealers 
and banks, Congress concluded this overstepped its intent. One might argue that disregarding the negative 
implication of Section 30(b) is consistent with some prior statements of the Supreme Court treating the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as a “clear statement rule.” Specifically, in Aramco, the Supreme Court 
invoked a clear statement rule to disregard a provision in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act that appeared 
to have the same sort of negative implication that exists in Section 30(b). 499 U.S. 244, 253 (1991) (rejecting a 
negative implication argument based upon the alien exemption provision). The court’s opinion in Morrison, 
however, does not disregard Section 30(b) based upon a clear statement rule under which only affirmative 
expressions of extraterritorial coverage count. For one thing, as just discussed, the opinion simply missed the 
negative implications of Section 30(b). Indeed, had the court only meant to disregard Section 30(b) as 
insufficient to rebut the presumption because of a clear statement rule, the court would not have returned to the 
section in support of its “focus” argument that Congress did not wish the Securities Exchange Act to apply to 
transactions abroad. Moreover, the opinion disclaims an intention to apply a clear statement rule. Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (“But we do not say . . . that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a “clear statement rule,” . . . if by that is meant a requirement that a statute say “this law 
applies abroad.” Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”). 
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A fourth argument by the Court pointed to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s interpretation of the reach of the 1933 Securities Act’s prohibition 
on selling unregistered securities.111 The SEC has interpreted the Securities Act 
generally not to require registration for securities sales outside the United 
States,112 which, the Court argued, evidences an understanding that the federal 
securities laws do not apply to sales taking place abroad.113 Actually, the court’s 
characterization of the SEC interpretation is a misleading oversimplification 
insofar as the SEC historically did not, and in its current rule does not, draw a 
bright line for the registration requirement based solely upon the location of the 
sale.114 
The Court’s final argument looked to complaints in various amicus briefs 
filed by foreign governments and business groups about the interference with 
foreign securities regulation created by extending Section 10(b) to transactions 
abroad.115 This is a straightforward policy argument, which Justice Scalia, 
presumably reflecting his advocacy of a textual approach to statutory 
interpretation, sought to disguise by arguing that Congress would have addressed 
the conflicts with foreign regimes created by extending private Section 10(b) 
suits to foreign sales had Congress intended Section 10(b) to reach such sales.116 
2. The Fundamental Flaw in Morrison’s Approach 
In the end, of course, the misunderstandings and flawed logic evident in the 
Court’s arguments based upon these statutory provisions is all water under the 
bridge; albeit there is a certain irony in a Supreme Court Justice, who recently 
coauthored a book advocating a textual approach to reading statutes,117 doing 
 
111. Id. at 2885. 
112. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2013). 
113. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2885-86. 
114. See, e.g., Don Berger, Offshore Distribution of Securities: The Impact of Regulation S, 3 
TRANSNAT’L. LAW. 575, 585 (1990) (discussing SEC interpretations, prior to Regulation S, of the application of 
the Securities Act registration requirement to overseas transactions, which viewed the registration requirement 
as applying to some sales to Americans overseas, and detailing the requirements of Regulation S, which 
excludes sales of securities outside the United States from the Securities Act registration requirement depending 
upon elaborate tests to address possible impacts of foreign offerings on U.S. markets).  
115. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2885-86. This seems to contradict other portions of the court’s opinion in 
which it says that comity and avoiding conflicts with other nations’ laws is not the issue; rather the issue is 
Congress’ intent. See generally id. 
116. Id. at 2886. Not only does this ignore the fact that legislation typically fails to address all the issues 
that arise with domestic applications, but the court’s argument is especially problematic insofar as courts 
created the private right of action for violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. This, of course, makes it rather difficult for Congress to have anticipated how to reconcile 
with foreign laws the ground rules for such a later judicially created action. 
117. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
(2012).  
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such a poor job of it. The critical point is what these arguments tell us the Court 
means when it refers to the focus of the statute for purposes of determining if a 
situation involves extraterritoriality. 
None of these arguments really show that the sale is the focus of Section 
10(b), in the sense that it is somehow of greater concern to Congress than is the 
fraud (instead of the fraud being of greater concern than is the sale). As the Court 
actually applied the test, the sale is the so-called focus of Section 10(b) simply 
because it is the conduct which, according to the Court, Congress intended must 
occur in the United States in order to trigger the statute.118 Moreover, the Court 
determined that this is Congress’ intent using (albeit poorly) the normal tools of 
statutory construction, looking at the statute’s language (the limitation of 
overseas coverage in Section 30(a) and (b) argument), purpose (the intent to 
regulate U.S. securities exchanges argument), administrative interpretation (the 
SEC interpretation of the territorial reach the 1933 Securities Act argument), as 
well as policy considerations (the clash with foreign regimes argument).119 In 
other words, these arguments were, for the most part, simply normal statutory 
construction arguments trying to show that Congress did not intend to regulate 
overseas sales.120 
At first glance, one may be tempted to say that this is a sensible approach to 
what is, after all, an issue of statutory interpretation. The problem, however, is 
that if the Court can conclude that Congress did not intend to regulate overseas 
sales based upon statutory language, overall purpose, administrative construction, 
policy, or the like, what is the point of invoking the presumption against 
extraterritoriality? Put differently, there is not much utility to a test for 
determining extraterritoriality if, to apply the test, the Court must decide whether 
Congress intended the statute to reach the situation facing the Court. After all, the 
purpose for determining if the situation before the Court involves 
extraterritoriality is so the Court can invoke the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as a means to decide what Congress intended. The end result is 
that the Morrison court created a test that is entirely circular, since it requires the 
Court to determine whether Congress intended the statute to reach the situation in 
order to invoke the presumption to determine whether Congress intended the 
statute to reach the situation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Morrison excoriated the Second 
Circuit for engaging in “judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what Congress 
 
118. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2888. 
119. See generally id. 
120. See generally id. 
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would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court.”121 Instead 
of such judicial lawmaking, the Court’s opinion claimed to find its answer in the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.122 In fact, however, a presumption 
regarding extraterritoriality no more dictated the Court’s approach than it did the 
Second Circuit’s. This is because, in order for the Court in Morrison to decide 
whether the situation triggered the presumption against extraterritoriality under 
its statutory focus test, the Court’s opinion in Morrison engaged in the same sort 
of divination of Congressional intent that it so condemned in the Second 
Circuit.123 
In the end, Morrison’s statutory focus test is useless if the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is to serve any real function in cross border situations in 
which some conduct or effect exists both within and outside the nation. In a 
future article, I will suggest a better approach.124 
 
 
121. Id. at 2881. 
122. Id. 
123. While not having anything to do with the presumption against extraterritoriality and so beyond the 
scope of this Article, one might argue that there still was a difference in methodology between the approach to 
determining Congressional intent used by the Second Circuit in developing and applying the conduct and 
effects test and the approach Justice Scalia used to determine that Congress did not intend the statute to cover 
fraud in connection with purchases and sales of securities outside the United States. The former involved a 
fairly free-ranging determination of whether it would effectuate the broad purposes of the statute to apply it to 
the situation at hand. See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 
421 (8th Cir. 1979) (“We frankly admit that the finding of subject matter jurisdiction in the present case is 
largely a policy decision.”). Justice Scalia’s opinion, by contrast, invokes the language in various specific 
provisions in the securities laws in support of his conclusion that Congress only intended to regulate 
transactions in the United States. Given how weak Justice Scalia’s textual analysis was (see supra Part III.C.2), 
it may have been more honest for Justice Scalia simply to engage in the same sort of broad purposes and policy 
argumentation used by the Second Circuit. 
124. See supra note 10. 
